# 1NC

### Off

#### Topical plans must remove explicit authorization to indefinitely detain--- The war power authority of the president is activated by Congressional authorization- that’s key to set a limit on what the term means

Bejesky 2013 [Robert Bejesky M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), LL.M. International Law ¶ (Georgetown). The author has taught international law courses for Cooley Law School and the ¶ Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, American government and ¶ constitutional law courses for Alma College, and business law courses at Central Michigan University ¶ and the University of Miami. 1/23/2013 “WAR POWERS PURSUANT TO FALSE PERCEPTIONS AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN THE “ZONE OF TWILIGHT”” St Mary’s Law Journal http://www.stmaryslawjournal.org/pdfs/Bejesky\_Step12.pdf]

Congressional war powers include the prerogatives to “declare War;” ¶ “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” which were operations that fell ¶ short of “war”; “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the ¶ land and naval Forces;” “to provide for organizing, arming, and ¶ disciplining, the Militia;” “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and ¶ Water;” “raise and support Armies;” and “provide and maintain a ¶ Navy.”¶ 46¶ Alternatively, the President is endowed with one war power, ¶ that of “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.”¶ 47¶ Numerical ¶ comparison indicates that the intended dominant branch in war powers ¶ decisions is Congress. The Commander in Chief authority is a core preclusive power that ¶ designates the President as the head of the military command chain once ¶ Congress activates the power.¶ 48¶ Moreover, peripheral Commander in ¶ Chief powers are bridled by both statutory and treaty restrictions.¶ 49¶ The ¶ media lore of using “Commander in Chief” coterminous with “President” ¶ might occasionally be a misnomer outside of war, perhaps abetting ¶ presidential expansionism when combined with commentators employing ¶ terms such as “inherent authority.” Clearly, if Congress has not activated ¶ war powers, the President still possesses inherent authority to react ¶ expeditiously and unilaterally to defend the nation when confronted with ¶ imminent peril.¶ 50¶ However, the Framers drew a precise distinction when ¶ they specifically empowered the President “to repel and not to commence ¶ war.”¶ 51¶ Alexander Hamilton explained that latitude was required “because ¶ it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national ¶ exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which ¶ may be necessary to satisfy them.”¶ 52

#### Prefer this interp based on limits- presidents assert they have the authority to do almost anything- they have huge institutional incentives to continue that trend- the negative cannot be expected to have a case neg to every assertion the OLC has ever made about what authority the president has

#### Our interpretation is also the best historically- prefer the legal grounding of our interpretation

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The Framers selected a unitary executive model in as much as the term ¶ denotes situating executive power within the dominion of one individual, ¶ rather than a plurality of executive officials.¶ 122¶ Accordingly, the President ¶ is elected “by the people or by an electoral college,”¶ 123¶ as differentiated ¶ from parliamentary systems in which members select executive officials to ¶ administer bureaucracies on behalf of the lawmakers.¶ 124¶ The Founders’ ¶ use of “unitary” did not appertain to initiating hostilities or to expanding ¶ executive authority relative to the legislature.¶ 125¶ Unfortunately, the term ¶ “unitary” has recently been appropriated to maintain that the Framers ¶ intended to grant the Executive expansive war power authority to the ¶ point that legislative encroachment was impermissible. ¶ Professor Robert Spitzer remarked, “The phrase ‘unitary executive’ was ¶ derived from references in the Federalist Papers to ‘unity’ in the ¶ executive.”¶ 126¶ Spitzer further explicated that the contorted, contemporary ¶ unitary executive theory aspires to expand executive power, “cherry-picks ¶ its evidence, often misrepresents the historical record, . . . ignores ¶ pertinent literature,” and “is an honest reading of the Constitution only if ¶ the reader is standing on his or her head at the time.”¶ 127¶ Inverted ¶ advocates would be accurate in contending the Framers strove to guard ¶ against legislative encroachments of presidential power,¶ 128¶ but the ¶ Framers also reasoned that unity in the Executive would auspiciously ¶ constrict presidential power because anything other than a single President ¶ might lead to responsibility shirking. Alexander Hamilton wrote that “one ¶ of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive . . . is that it ¶ tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility . . . . [T]he multiplication ¶ of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case.”¶ 129¶ The Framers did address a unitary executive within the lexicon of war ¶ powers, but did so to accentuate that a single leader would foster efficient ¶ military action during a congressionally authorized war and that he or she ¶ could swiftly defend the nation in the event of an attack.¶ 130¶ The preexisting system governed by the Articles of Confederation did not ¶ establish any executive authority,¶ 131¶ which made conducting war ¶ unwieldy.¶ 132¶ The Continental Congress appointed a military command, ¶ removed dissatisfactory commanders in chief, and directed military ¶ activities.¶ 133¶ Congress was not an efficient decision-maker for ¶ prosecuting war;¶ 134¶ therefore, the Framers discerned that one authority ¶ should conceive military strategy and issue directives.¶ 135¶ At the North ¶ Carolina debates, James Iredell explained, “[T]he command of armies ¶ ought to be delegated to one person only. The secrecy, [dispatch], and ¶ decision, which are necessary in military operations, can only be expected ¶ from one person.”¶ 136¶ Hamilton further expressed: ¶ Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most ¶ peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power ¶ by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the common ¶ strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength ¶ forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive ¶ authority.¶ 137

### Off

#### Obama’s strength will allow a debt deal without complicated battle and additional spending cuts

JONATHAN ALLEN | 9/19/13 6:42 PM EDT Read more: http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/republicans-budget-obama-97093.html#ixzz2fRhWaU12

There’s a simple reason President Barack Obama is using his bully pulpit to focus the nation’s attention on the battle over the budget: In this fight, he’s watching Republicans take swings at each other. And that GOP fight is a lifeline for an administration that had been scrambling to gain control its message after battling congressional Democrats on the potential use of military force in Syria and the possible nomination of Larry Summers to run the Federal Reserve. If House Republicans and Obama can’t cut even a short-term deal for a continuing resolution, the government’s authority to spend money will run out on Oct. 1. Within weeks, the nation will default on its debt if an agreement isn’t reached to raise the federal debt limit. For some Republicans, those deadlines represent a leverage point that can be used to force Obama to slash his health care law. For others, they’re a zero hour at which the party will implode if it doesn’t cut a deal. Meanwhile, “on the looming fiscal issues, Democrats — both liberal and conservative, executive and congressional — are virtually 100 percent united,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.). Just a few days ago, all that Obama and his aides could talk about were Syria and Summers. Now, they’re bringing their party together and shining a white hot light on Republican disunity over whether to shut down the government and plunge the nation into default in a vain effort to stop Obamacare from going into effect. The squabbling among Republicans has gotten so vicious that a Twitter hashtag — #GOPvsGOPugliness — has become a thick virtual data file for tracking the intraparty insults. Moderates, and even some conservatives, are slamming Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, a tea party favorite, for ramping up grassroots expectations that the GOP will shut down the government if it can’t win concessions from the president to “defund” his signature health care law. “I didn’t go to Harvard or Princeton, but I can count,” Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) tweeted, subtly mocking Cruz’s Ivy League education. “The defunding box canyon is a tactic that will fail and weaken our position.” While it is well-timed for the White House to interrupt a bad slide, Obama’s singular focus on the budget battle is hardly a last-minute shift. Instead, it is a return to the narrative arc that the White House was working to build before the Syria crisis intervened. And it’s so important to the president’s strategy that White House officials didn’t consider postponing Monday’s rollout of the most partisan and high-stakes phase even when a shooter murdered a dozen people at Washington’s Navy Yard that morning. The basic storyline, well under way over the summer, was to have the president point to parts of his agenda, including reducing the costs of college and housing, designed to strengthen the middle class; use them to make the case that he not only saved the country from economic disaster but is fighting to bolster the nation’s finances on both the macro and household level; and then argue that Republicans’ desire to lock in the sequester and leverage a debt-ceiling increase for Obamacare cuts would reverse progress made. The president is on firm ground, White House officials say, because he stands with the public in believing that the government shouldn’t shut down and that the country should pay its bills. ”It would not be good for the middle class of this country or for our general economy to see a lapse in the funding of essential government operations,” White House press secretary Jay Carney said Thursday. Republican leaders say it’s Obama who is out of touch. “Americans don’t support Obamacare, and they don’t support increasing the debt limit without any measures to reduce the deficit itself,” said Brendan Buck, spokesman for House Speaker John Boehner. “The president has put himself in the position of defending two things that put him on the wrong side of public opinion.” Democrats say their Syria fight looked like Yalta compared to the GOP’s “civil war” over Obamacare, the continuing resolution and the debt limit. Still, Obama spent the first weeks of September making the case for a military strike that was unpopular not just with the public but with his own Democratic allies in Congress. At worst, it was a demonstration that he has lost influence on Capitol Hill and within his own party. At best, it was a major message distraction. Carney alluded to the lost Syria weeks on Monday when he said “time is short” for the president to make his case before the deadline for extending government funding. Now, the White House has seemingly pushed its message machine back on track — and it’s getting an extra boost from congressional Democrats who want to take the fight to the GOP. Some House Democrats privately express the view — to reporters and to the White House — that it might be better to let the government shut down rather than extend sequester-level spending for a few months. Such a destabilizing event could do enough damage to the GOP brand to shatter Republicans’ lock on a House majority in next year’s election, they hope, without seriously harming the economy. The White House would clearly prefer to simply keep the government funded and raise the debt ceiling without a crisis — after all, Obama risks collateral damage even if Republicans are hurt by a shutdown.“It is not our policy and not our view that a shutdown would be anything but bad,” Carney said.

Still, aides to the president and Boehner have said there’s no back-channeling going on between the two leaders, and White House officials say that while they expect Obama to talk with congressional leaders soon, there’s nothing on the schedule at the moment.

There’s also reason to think that the GOP establishment is afraid the brinksmen among House Democrats are right about who will win the political aftermath of a government shutdown or a default. Republican strategists outside the crowded conservative corners of the House Republican Conference are reacting along a spectrum that ranges from scratching their heads to tearing their hair out. Nicolle Wallace, a former communications aide to President George W. Bush, had told MSNBC’s “Morning Joe” on Wednesday that Obama erred by giving a partisan speech on the budget fights on the heels of a massacre in Washington. “It really speaks to me about a White House with no more controls. There are no internal controls anymore. There’s no process by which that staff can get to him and make something stop,” she said. “Once a train has been pushed out of the station, no matter how ill-advised its course, nothing and no one can stop it.” By Thursday, the transportation metaphors cut in the other direction. “We are going to let our party run into moving traffic against a red light,” she said on the same program. “It’s idiotic.” The Wall Street Journal editorial page and Karl Rove, Bush’s chief strategist, have also taken fellow Republicans to task in recent days for letting Obama get the upper hand with their obsessive — and sure to fail — effort to kill Obamacare at any potential political cost. There are potential pitfalls for Democrats, too. They risk getting caught up in a blame game if there’s a shutdown and they vote against a GOP-written bill that would extend government funding while blocking Obamacare funds. Even without the Obamacare provision — which could, conceivably, be stripped out by the Senate — many of them don’t want to lock in current spending levels because they say the sequestration deal struck at the end of a similar showdown in August 2011 has robbed their communities of needed funding. That makes it hard to swallow a so-called clean extension of government funding for a few months. Democratic Rep. Gerry Connolly, who represents thousands of government workers and contractors in northern Virginia, is against both a shutdown and the maintenance of current spending levels. He would vote for a clean CR to keep the government funded rather than letting it shut down but would prefer to see the president strike a deal that increases funding for some priorities. In any event, he said, he won’t vote for legislation that defunds Obamacare — like the version of the CR that the House is set to vote on Friday. But Connolly and other Democrats seem willing to follow Obama, who is vowing not to cut Obamacare or negotiate over whether to raise the debt limit next month, all without getting into the details of a possible deal. At least for now. “He has not really given much away,” Connolly said. “I think his Sphinx-like position with respect to the Republicans makes it harder for them to exact unacceptable concessions, and therefore it’s probably a wise posture at this time.”

#### Plan’s unpopular

McAuliff 6/15

(Michael, covers Congress and politics for The Huffington Post, “Indefinite Detention Of Americans Survives House Vote,” June 15, 2013, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article35289.htm)

June 15, 2013 "Information Clearing House - WASHINGTON -- The U.S. House of Representatives voted again Thursday to allow the indefinite military detention of Americans, blocking an amendment that would have barred the possibility. Congress wrote that authority into law in the National Defense Authorization Act two years ago, prompting outrage from civil libertarians on the left and right. President Barack Obama signed the measure, but insisted his administration would never use it. Supporters of detention argue that the nation needs to be able to arrest and jail suspected terrorists without trial, including Americans on U.S. soil, for as long as there is a war on terror. Their argument won, and the measure was defeated by a vote of 200 to 226. But opponents, among them the Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), who offered the amendment to end that authority, argued that such detention is a stain on the Constitution that unnecessarily militarizes U.S. law enforcement. "It is a dangerous step toward executive and military power to allow things like indefinite detention under military control within the U.S.," Smith said. "That's the heart and essence of this issue." Smith's amendment, which also had Republican sponsors including Reps. Chris Gibson (N.Y.) and Justin Amash (Mich.), would guarantee that anyone arrested in the United States gets a trial. Republican opponents argued that such a move would just invite terrorists to come to the United States, citing the recent Boston bombings and the consulate attacks in Benghazi, Libya, as evidence that terrorists were determined to harm the U.S. They said that applying the Constitution on U.S. soil amounted to a free pass to people bent on trying to destroy the country. Rep. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), compared ending indefinite detention to giving someone a free pass in a game of hide-and-seek. "There was a phrase in that game called 'olly olly oxen free' -- meant you could come out, you were safe, you no longer had to hide," Cotton argued. "This amendment is the olly olly oxen free amendment of the war on terrorism. It invites Al Qaeda and associated forces to send terrorists to the Untied States and recruit terrorists on U.S. soil."

#### Failure to quickly raise the debt ceiling ensures collapse of the global economy, U.S. economic leadership, and free trade

Davidson 9/10

Adam, co-founder of NPR’s “Planet Money,” a podcast and blog, “Our Debt to Society”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>, MCR

**If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted** again this fall, some **serious financial decisions will have to be made**. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually **the big-ticket items**, like **Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut**. At some point, **the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter** what’s known as **sovereign default**, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). **In the case of the U**nited **S**tates, though, **it won’t be** an **isolated** national crisis. **If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency**, then **the global financial system will** very likely **enter a new era in which there is much less trade and** much less **economic growth. It would be**, by most accounts, **the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history**.¶ **Nearly everyone** involved **predicts** that **someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans** (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) **appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised** — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.¶ Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, **the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds**. **The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing** — **which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse** far worse **than anything we’ve seen in the past several years**.¶ Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar.¶ While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that **while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable**. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, **the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy**.¶ The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, **the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters**. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, **the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier**.

#### Econ collapse = extinction

Kemp 10 Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

### Off

**Capture over drones now**

David **Corn 13**, Washington Bureau Chief at Mother Jones, 5/23/13, “Obama's Counterterrorism Speech: A Pivot Point on Drones and More?,” http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/05/obama-speech-drones-civil-liberties

So **Obama's speech Thursday on counterterrorism policies**—which follows his administration's acknowledgment yesterday that it had killed four Americans (including Anwar al-Awlaki, an Al Qaeda leader in Yemen)—**is a big deal, for** with this address, **Obama is self-restricting his use of drones and shifting control of them** from the CIA to the military. And the president has approved making public the rules governing drone strikes.¶ The New York Times received the customary pre-speech leak and reported:¶ **A new classified policy guidance** signed by Mr. Obama **will sharply curtail the instances when unmanned aircraft can be used to attack in places that are not overt war zones,** countries like Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. The rules will impose the same standard for strikes on foreign enemies now used only for American citizens deemed to be terrorists.¶ **Lethal force will be used only against targets who pose "a continuing, imminent threat to Americans"** and cannot feasibly be captured**,** Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. said in a letter to Congress, suggesting that threats to a partner like Afghanistan or Yemen alone would not be enough to justify being targeted.¶ These moves may not satisfy civil-liberties-minded critics on sthe right and the left**. Obama is not declaring an end to indefinite detention or announcing the closing of Gitmo—though** he is echoing his State of the Union vow to revive efforts to shut down that prison. Still, these moves would be unimaginable in the Bush years. Bush and Cheney essentially believed the commander in chief had unchallenged power during wartime, and the United States, as they saw it, remained at war against terrorism. Yet here **is Obama subjecting the drone program to a more restrictive set of rules—and doing so publicly.** This is very un-Cheney-like. (How soon before the ex-veep arises from his undisclosed location to accuse Obama of placing the nation at risk yet again?)¶ Despite Obama's embrace of certain Bush-Cheney practices and his robust use of drones, the president has tried since taking office to shift US foreign policy from a fixation on terrorism. During his first days in office, he shied away from using the "war on terrorism" phrase. And his national security advisers have long talked of Obama's desire to reorient US foreign policy toward challenges in the Pacific region. By handing responsibility for drone strikes to the military, Obama is helping CIA chief John Brennan, who would like to see his agency move out of the paramilitary business and devote more resources to its traditional tasks of intelligence gathering and analysis.¶ With this speech, **Obama is not renouncing his administration's claim that it possesses the authority to kill an American overseas without full due process.** The target, as Holder noted in that letter to Congress, must be a senior operational leader of Al Qaeda or an associated group who poses an "imminent threat of violent attack against the United States" and who cannot be captured, and **Holder stated that foreign suspects now can only be targeted if they pose "a continuing, imminent threat to Americans."** (Certainly, **there will be debates over the meaning of "imminent,"** especially given that the Obama administration has previously used an elastic definition of imminence.) And **Obama is not declaring an end to the dicey practice of indefinite detention or a conclusion to the fight against terrorism.**

**Plan spurs shift towards drones**

**Chesney 11** (Robert, Charles I. Francis Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law, “ARTICLE: WHO MAY BE HELD? MILITARY DETENTION THROUGH THE HABEAS LENS”, Boston College Law Review, 52 B.C. L. Rev 769, Lexis)

The convergence thesis describes one manner in which **law might respond to** the **cross-cutting pressures associated with** the **asymmetric warfare** phenomenon—i.e., **the pressure to** reduce false positives (targeting, capture, or detention of the wrong individual) while also **ensur**ing an **adequate capacity to neutralize the non-state actors in question**. One must bear in mind, however, that **detention** itself **is not the only system of government action that can satisfy that latter interest. Other options exist, including the use of lethal force**; the use of rendition to place individuals in detention at the hands of some other state; the use of persuasion to induce some other state to take custody of an individual through its own means; and perhaps also the use of various forms of surveillance to establish a sort of constructive, loose control over a person (though for persons located outside the United States it is unlikely that surveillance could be much more than episodic, and thus any resulting element of “control” may be quite weak).210¶ From the point of view of the individual involved, all but the last of **these options are likely to be far worse experiences than** U.S.-administered **detention**. In addition, **all** but the last **are** also likely to be far **less useful for** purposes of **intelligence-gathering** from the point of view of the U.S. government.211 Nonetheless, these **alternatives may** **grow attractive to the government in circumstances where the detention alternative becomes unduly restricted, yet the pressure for intervention remains. The situation is** rather **like squeezing a balloon: the result is not to shrink the balloon, but instead to displace the pressure from one side to another, causing the balloon to distend along the unconstrained side**. So too here: **when one of these coercive powers becomes constrained in** new, more **restrictive ways, the displaced pressure to incapacitate may simply find expression through one of the alternative mechanisms**. On this view **it is no surprise that lethal drone strikes have increased dramatically over the past two years**, that the Obama administration has refused to foreswear rendition, that in Iraq we have largely (though not entirely) outsourced our detention operations to the Iraqis, and that we now are progressing along the same path in Afghanistan.212¶ **Decisions regarding the calibration o**f a **detention** system—the¶ management of the convergence process, if you will—**thus take place in the shadow of this balloon-squeezing phenomenon**. A thorough policy review would take this into account, as should any formal lawmaking process. For the moment, however, our formal law-making process is not directed at the detention-scope question. Instead, clarification and development with respect to the substantive grounds for detention takes place through the lens of habeas corpus litigation.

#### Unchecked drone usage causes great power war and hotspot escalation

Dowd 2013 (Alan W. Dowd, widely published writer on national defense, foreign policy, and international security including contributions to Parameters, Policy Review, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, World Politics Review, American Outlook, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, The National Post, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, and The Financial Times Deutschland, Winter-Spring 2013, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” Parameters, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/WinterSpring\_2013/1\_Article\_Dowd.pdf)

If these geo-political consequences of remote-control war do not get ¶ our attention, then the looming geo-strategic consequences should. If ¶ we make the argument that UCAV pilots are in the battlespace, then we are effectively saying that the battlespace is the entire earth. If that is the ¶ case, the unintended consequences could be dramatic.¶ First, if the battlespace is the entire earth, the enemy would seem to ¶ have the right to wage war on those places where UCAV operators are based. ¶ That’s a sobering thought, one few policymakers have contemplated.¶ Second, power-projecting nations are following America’s lead and ¶ developing their own drones to target their distant enemies by remote. ¶ An estimated 75 countries have drone programs underway.45 Many of ¶ these nations are less discriminating in employing military force than ¶ the United States—and less skillful. Indeed, drones may usher in a new ¶ age of accidental wars. If the best drones deployed by the best military ¶ crash more than any other aircraft in America’s fleet, imagine the accident rate for mediocre drones deployed by mediocre militaries. And then ¶ imagine the international incidents this could trigger between, say, India and Pakistan; North and South Korea; Russia and the Baltics or Poland ¶ or Georgia; China and any number of its wary neighbors.¶ China has at least one dozen drones on the drawing board or in production, and has announced plans to dot its coastline with 11 drone bases ¶ in the next two years.46 The Pentagon’s recent reports on Chinese military power detail “acquisition and development of longer-range UAVs ¶ and UCAVs . . . for long-range reconnaissance and strike”; development ¶ of UCAVs to enable “a greater capacity for military preemption”; and ¶ interest in “converting retired fighter aircraft into unmanned combat ¶ aerial vehicles.”47 At a 2011 air show, Beijing showcased one of its newest drones by playing a video demonstrating a pilotless plane tracking a US ¶ aircraft carrier near Taiwan and relaying targeting information.48¶ Equally worrisome, the proliferation of drones could enable nonpower-projecting nations—and nonnations, for that matter—to join the ¶ ranks of power-projecting nations. Drones are a cheap alternative to ¶ long-range, long-endurance warplanes. Yet despite their low cost, drones ¶ can pack a punch. And owing to their size and range, they can conceal ¶ their home address far more effectively than the typical, nonstealthy ¶ manned warplane. Recall that the possibility of surprise attack by drones ¶ was cited to justify the war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.49¶ Of course, cutting-edge UCAVs have not fallen into undeterrable ¶ hands. But if history is any guide, they will. Such is the nature of proliferation. Even if the spread of UCAV technology does not harm the ¶ United States in a direct way, it is unlikely that opposing swarms of ¶ semiautonomous, pilotless warplanes roaming about the earth, striking at will, veering off course, crashing here and there, and sometimes ¶ simply failing to respond to their remote-control pilots will do much to ¶ promote a liberal global order.¶ It would be ironic if the promise of risk-free warpresented by drones ¶ spawned a new era of danger for the United States and its allies.

### Case

#### 4GW is the most accurate description of modern war- executive authority is key to counter these threats

Li 2009 [Zheyoa Li Winter, 2009 The Georgetown Journal of Law Public Policy 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 373 “War Powers for the Fourth Generation: Constitutional Interpretation in the Age of Asymmetric Warfare” lexis]

Even as the quantity of nation-states in the world has increased dramatically since the end of World War II, the institution of the nation-state has been in decline over the past few decades. Much of this decline is the direct result of the waning of major interstate war, which primarily resulted from the introduction of nuclear weapons. 122 The proliferation of nuclear weapons, and their immense capacity for absolute destruction, has ensured that conventional wars remain limited in scope and duration. Hence, "both the size of the armed forces and the quantity of weapons at their disposal has declined quite sharply" since 1945. 123 At the same time, concurrent with the decline of the nation-state in the second half of the twentieth century, non-state actors have increasingly been willing and able to use force to advance their causes. In contrast to nation-states, who adhere to the Clausewitzian distinction between the ends of policy and the means of war to achieve those ends, non-state actors do not necessarily fight as a mere means of advancing any coherent policy. Rather, they see their fight as a life-and-death struggle, wherein the ordinary terminology of war as an instrument of policy breaks down because of this blending of means and ends. 124¶ It is the existential nature of this struggle and the disappearance of the Clausewitzian distinction between war and policy that has given rise to a new generation of warfare. The concept of fourth-generational warfare was first articulated in an influential article in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, which has proven highly prescient. In describing what they saw as the modern trend toward a new phase of warfighting, the authors argued that:¶ [\*395] In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). 125 It is precisely this blurring of peace and war and the demise of traditionally definable battlefields that provides the impetus for the formulation of a new theory of war powers. As evidenced by Part III, supra, the constitutional allocation of war powers, and the Framers' commitment of the war power to two co-equal branches, was not designed to cope with the current international system, one that is characterized by the persistent machinations of international terrorist organizations, the rise of multilateral alliances, the emergence of rogue states, and the potentially wide proliferation of easily deployable weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and otherwise.

#### Most likely nuclear escalation

Richards 2005 (Dr. Chet Richards, J. Addams & Partners July 12, 2005, “Dear Mr. & Ms. 1RP: Welcome to the 21st Century” http://www.zmetro.com/pdf/2005/07/welcome\_21st\_century\_v4.pdf)

Beginning with Mao Tse-Tung, and continuing to the present day, insurgency and other forms of non-state warfare have become more potent and much more dangerous in at least two ways: Groups other than states – that is, multinational organizations ranging from alQa’ida to the narcotrafficking cartels – are beginning to acquire high levels of sophistication in organization and in the information technologies that allow them to plan and conduct operations while widely dispersed.4 These same groups increasingly have the financial wherewithal to acquire virtually any type of weapon, from small arms to chemical and biological to nuclear, that they need to carry out operations. The only exceptions are conventional weapons such as tanks, combat aircraft, and fighting ships that require large facilities to support them, but are primarily of use only against other military forces armed with the same types of weapons. They are using their new capabilities not only to fight local governments, as was the case with traditional insurgencies, but to attack distant superpowers as well. Because they can’t field sizable amounts of conventional military hardware, fourth generation (4GW) forces will never try to achieve victory by defeating the military forces of a state in stand-up battles. Instead, they will try to convince their state opponent that it is simply not worth it to continue the fight. Successful 4GWcampaigns in modern times would include those against the French in Algeria, the US in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, where the insurgents never defeated the foreign armies in any major battle, but eventually persuaded the governments back home to withdraw them. In a well run 4GW campaign, everything the 4GW forces do – including fighting and usually losing the occasional major battle – will support this goal. Persuading governments to withdraw forces, rather than defeating them on the battlefield, is an “information age” goal.6 To achieve the necessary level of persuasion, practitioners of 4GWwill use every information tool they can find to spread their messages to the enemy population and decision makers: Our cause is just and no threat to you There’s nothing here worth your effort and sacrifice Your troops are becoming brutal and your tactics ineffective If you keep it up, you’re going to bleed for a very long time So why not just leave now? As we enter the 21st Century, 4GWorganizations are becoming adept at spreading such messages through new channels, such as global news services (CNN, Al Jazeerah) and of course, web sites, blogs, and mass e-mailings. What you may not be aware of is that 4GWorganizations are also using the latest information tools to communicate with each other and to share information, particularly about what is and is not working (what the military calls “lessons learned.”)7Messages may be encrypted, or sent using code phrases, or even hidden in web site images, a practice called steganography. As with so many information age techniques, instructions for encryption and steganography are floating all over the Internet. Information age techniques are ideal for loose networks of highly motivated individuals, which is a typical form of organization for 4GW groups. Modern information warfare places a higher premium on creativity and innovation than it does on things 4GW organizations typically don’t have, like massive forces, volumes of regulations, and expensive hardware.8 By emphasizing speed and innovation, 4GWgroups can often invent new techniques faster than more structured and bureaucratic organizations such as the Pentagon.9 First responder organizations themselves may be targets of information warfare operations. The information systems of 1RP organizations, including operational systems as well as payroll and administrative, might make attractive targets in coordination with a physical attack. This is a real threat: Many members of al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups are from the educated classes in their countries, were technically trained (Osama bin Laden is a civil engineer), studied and lived in the West, and are capable of conceiving and managing such attacks. There are other advantages to the non-state player from operating in a loose social network. Obviously a social network is harder to find than an organization that requires a fixed infrastructure and wears uniforms. But perhaps most significant in wars of the weak against the strong, networks are highly resilient, so killing their leaders and destroying portions of the network can leave the rest to regenerate under new leadership in different locations.1112 So long as enough of the network survives to pass along the ideology and culture, along with lessons learned, the new network will likely be more dangerous and more resilient than its predecessor, much like the more resistant forms of bacteria that can emerge as a result of mis-use of antibiotics. In fact, the European resistance movements during World War II exhibited just this kind of toughness and survivability. In addition to its networked structure, there are other attributes of 4GW that should concern the 1RP (editor’s note: First Responder) community. The first is its transnational nature. An operation can be approved in Afghanistan, planned in Germany, funded in the Middle East, and carried out in the United States, as was the 9/11 attack. There is no one state we can retaliate against, nor one nationality we can profile against. Further, because it is transnational, it can involve networks of networks, such as alQa’ida attempting to cooperate with narco-trafficking organizations in Latin America to trade access to potential base areas and help in infiltrating the US for assistance in distributing narcotics.13 The upshot is that the lack of identifiable 4GW activity may not be an indication that an attack is not in the works, if the su4rveillance is being conducted by someone else. One of the more unpleasant aspects of insurgencies that will likely carry over to 4GWis their use of disguise, camouflage, and the other tools of deception. Because they are militarily weak, 4GW groups survive not by confronting superior firepower but by staying out of its sights. Those that have survived have become masters of concealment and deception, making it even more difficult to pick up early warning signals. This is why simple ethnic or national profiling will not work – 4GWteams will go to great lengths not to be identified as members of the groups in question. Skin color, eye color, and hair color are trivially easy to change, and the criminal infrastructure that already exists in most developed countries makes it simple to get drivers licenses or other means of identification (as any victim of identity theft can attest.) In a pinch, one can always recruit a member of a non-targeted group, such as the “shoe bomber,” Richard Reid, and it would be a mistake to assume the next batch will be as poorly trained. If we’re going to let Icelanders (or grandmothers or parents with toddlers, or whoever) through with less security screening than Saudis or Pakistanis or Jordanians, see if you can guess what the next aircraft hijacker will look like. Another unpleasant fact of 4GW is that like insurgency from whence it sprang, 4GW will be a protracted struggle.14 As Henry Kissinger once noted, if the guerillas don’t lose, they win, so they have all the motivation they need to keep going for as long as they think it will take.15 First responders should not draw comfort from what seems like a pause in attacks – operational cycles can stretch over several years, and a fourth generation war can span decades.16 But the most unpleasant fact of 4GW is that in it, we have finally reached the level of total war.17 In the eyes of the 4GW attacker, there are no civilians and no noncombatants. A concern for public relations offers the only reason for limiting the scope or violence of the attacks. What seems like “terrorism” to us, or senseless, random violence, may appear to the 4GW network as a legitimate way to persuade the foreign state government to withdraw, that is to stop the war. Such a strategy is nothing new. It was what Sherman had in mind during his marches through the South after the fall of Vicksburg (July 1863).18 In its local areas, the 4GW organization will spread the message that the foreign state has killed many civilians, which in a war of an advanced state versus a Third World country will often be true and will always be believed. What this means is that when a 4GW group decides to directly attack the United States or another state involved in “their” struggle, no level of violence, even nuclear, is ruled out. They may calculate that the message they are sending to the state government, to the state’s population, to undecided elements in other parts of the world, and to their own members is worth any backlash from the scenes of horror and brutality that ensue.

#### Predictions necessary good enough

Garrett 2012 (Banning Garrett, director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Foresight Initiative, consultant for 22 years to the Department of Defense and other U.S. Government agencies carrying on a strategic dialogue with China, senior associate at CSIS and a founding board member of the U.S. Committee for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific and an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at George Washington University, January 23, 2012, “In Search of Sand Piles and Butterflies,” Atlantic Council, http://www.acus.org/disruptive\_change/search-sand-piles-and-butterflies)

“Disruptive change” that produces “strategic shocks” has become an increasing concern for policymakers, shaken by momentous events of the last couple of decades that were not on their radar screens – from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the 2008 financial crisis and the “Arab Spring.” These were all shocks to the international system, predictable perhaps in retrospect but predicted by very few experts or officials on the eve of their occurrence.¶ This “failure” to predict specific strategic shocks does not mean we should abandon efforts to foresee disruptive change or look at all possible shocks as equally plausible. Most strategic shocks do not “come out of the blue.” We can understand and project long-term global trends and foresee at least some of their potential effects, including potential shocks and disruptive change. We can construct alternative futures scenarios to envision potential change, including strategic shocks. Based on trends and scenarios, we can take actions to avert possible undesirable outcomes or limit the damage should they occur. We can also identify potential opportunities or at least more desirable futures that we seek to seize through policy course corrections.¶ We should distinguish “strategic shocks” that are developments that could happen at any time and yet may never occur. This would include such plausible possibilities as use of a nuclear device by terrorists or the emergence of an airborne human-to-human virus that could kill millions. Such possible but not inevitable developments would not necessarily be the result of worsening long-term trends. Like possible terrorist attacks, governments need to try to prepare for such possible catastrophes though they may never happen.¶ But there are other potential disruptive changes, including those that create strategic shocks to the international system, that can result from identifiable trends that make them more likely in the future—for example, growing demand for food, water, energy and other resources with supplies failing to keep pace. We need to look for the “sand piles” that the trends are building and are subject to collapse at some point with an additional but indeterminable additional “grain of sand” and identify the potential for the sudden appearance of “butterflies” that might flap their wings and set off hurricanes. Mohamed Bouazizi, who immolated himself December 17, 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, was the butterfly who flapped his wings and (with the “force multiplier” of social media) set off a hurricane that is still blowing throughout the Middle East. Perhaps the metaphors are mixed, but the butterfly’s delicate flapping destabilized the sand piles (of rising food prices, unemployed students, corrupt government, etc.) that had been building in Tunisia, Egypt, and much of the region. The result was a sudden collapse and disruptive change that has created a strategic shock that is still producing tremors throughout the region. But the collapse was due to cumulative effects of identifiable and converging trends. When and what form change will take may be difficult if not impossible to foresee, but the likelihood of a tipping point being reached—that linear continuation of the present into the future is increasingly unlikely—can be foreseen.¶ Foreseeing the direction of change and the likelihood of discontinuities, both sudden and protracted, is thus not beyond our capabilities. While efforts to understand and project long-term global trends cannot provide accurate predictions, for example, of the GDPs of China, India, and the United States in 2030, looking at economic and GDP growth trends, can provide insights into a wide range of possible outcomes. For example, it is a useful to assess the implications if the GDPs of these three countries each grew at currently projected average rates – even if one understands that there are many factors that can and likely will alter their trajectories. The projected growth trends of the three countries suggest that at some point in the next few decades, perhaps between 2015 and 2030, China’s GDP will surpass that of the United States. And by adding consideration of the economic impact of demographic trends (China’s aging and India’s youth bulge), there is a possibility that India will surpass both China and the US, perhaps by 2040 or 2050, to become the world’s largest economy. These potential shifts of economic power from the United States to China then to India would likely prove strategically disruptive on a global scale. Although slowly developing, such disruptive change would likely have an even greater strategic impact than the Arab Spring. The “rise” of China has already proved strategically disruptive, creating a potential China-United States regional rivalry in Asia two decades after Americans fretted about an emerging US conflict with a then-rising Japan challenging American economic supremacy.¶ Despite uncertainty surrounding projections, foreseeing the possibility (some would say high likelihood) that China and then India will replace the United States as the largest global economy has near-term policy implications for the US and Europe. The potential long-term shift in economic clout and concomitant shift in political power and strategic position away from the US and the West and toward the East has implications for near-term policy choices. Policymakers could conclude, for example, that the West should make greater efforts to bring the emerging (or re-emerging) great powers into close consultation on the “rules of the game” and global governance as the West’s influence in shaping institutions and behavior is likely to significantly diminish over the next few decades. The alternative to finding such a near-term accommodation could be increasing mutual suspicions and hostility rather than trust and growing cooperation between rising and established powers—especially between China and the United States—leading to a fragmented, zero-sum world in which major global challenges like climate change and resource scarcities are not addressed and conflict over dwindling resources and markets intensifies and even bleeds into the military realm among the major actors.¶ Neither of these scenarios may play out, of course. Other global trends suggest that sometime in the next several decades, the world could encounter a “hard ceiling” on resources availability and that climate change could throw the global economy into a tailspin, harming China and India even more than the United States. In this case, perhaps India and China would falter economically leading to internal instability and crises of governance, significantly reducing their rates of economic growth and their ability to project power and play a significant international role than might otherwise have been expected. But this scenario has other implications for policymakers, including dangers posed to Western interests from “failure” of China and/or India, which could produce huge strategic shocks to the global system, including a prolonged economic downturn in the West as well as the East.¶ Thus, looking at relatively slowly developing trends can provide foresight for necessary course corrections now to avert catastrophic disruptive change or prepare to be more resilient if foreseeable but unavoidable shocks occur.¶ Policymakers and the public will press for predictions and criticize government officials and intelligence agencies when momentous events “catch us by surprise.” But unfortunately, as both Yogi Berra and Neils Bohr are credited with saying, “prediction is very hard, especially about the future.” One can predict with great accuracy many natural events such as sunrise and the boiling point of water at sea level. We can rely on the infallible predictability of the laws of physics to build airplanes and automobiles and iPhones. And we can calculate with great precision the destruction footprint of a given nuclear weapon. Yet even physical systems like the weather as they become more complex, become increasingly difficult and even inherently impossible to predict with precision.¶ With human behavior, specific predictions are not just hard, but impossible as uncertainty is inherent in the human universe. As futurist Paul Saffo wrote in the Harvard Business Review in 2007, “prediction is possible only in a world in which events are preordained and no amount of actions in the present can influence the future outcome.” One cannot know for certain what actions he or she will take in the future much less the actions of another person, a group of people or a nation state. This obvious point is made to dismiss any idea of trying to “predict” what will occur in the future with accuracy, especially the outcomes of the interplay of many complex factors, including the interaction of human and natural systems. More broadly, the human future is not predetermined but rather depends on human choices at every turning point, cumulatively leading to different alternative outcomes. This uncertainty about the future also means the future is amenable to human choice and leadership. Trends analyses—including foreseeing trends leading to disruptive change—are thus essential to provide individuals, organizations and political leaders with the strategic foresight to take steps mitigate the dangers ahead and seize the opportunities for shaping the human destiny.¶ Peter Schwartz nearly a decade ago characterized the convergence of trends and disruptive change as “inevitable surprises.” He wrote in Inevitable Surprises that “in the coming decades we face many more inevitable surprises: major discontinuities in the economic, political and social spheres of our world, each one changing the ‘rules of the game’ as its played today. If anything, there will be more, no fewer, surprises in the future, and they will all be interconnected. Together, they will lead us into a world, ten to fifteen years hence, that is fundamentally different from the one we know today. Understanding these inevitable surprises in our future is critical for the decisions we have to make today …. We may not be able to prevent catastrophe (although sometimes we can), but we can certainly increase our ability to respond, and our ability to see opportunities that we would otherwise miss.”

#### Util good- Calculation is good and doesn’t devalue life

Revesz 2008 Richard L. Revesz (Dean and Lawrence King Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, JD Yale Law School) and Michael A Livermore. (JD NYU School of Law, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Integrity, and Managing director of the NYU Law Review). Retaking Rationality How Cots-Benefit Analysis Can Better protect the Environment and Our Health. 2008. P. 1-4.

Governmental decisions are also fundamentally different from personal decisions in that they often affect people in the aggregate. In our individual lives, we come into contact with at least some of the consequences of our decisions. If we fail to consult a map, we pay the price: losing valuable time driving around in circles and listening to the complaints of our passengers. We are constantly confronted with the consequences of the choices that we have made. Not so for governments, however, which exercise authority by making decisions at a distance. Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of governmental decisions is that they require a special kind of compassion—one that can seem, at first glance, cold and calculating, the antithesis of empathy. The aggregate and complex nature of governmental decisions does not address people as human beings, with concerns and interests, families and emotional relationships, secrets and sorrows. Rather, people are numbers stacked in a column or points on a graph, described not through their individual stories of triumph and despair, but by equations, functions, and dose-response curves. The language of governmental decisionmaking can seem to—and to a certain extent does—ignore what makes individuals unique and morally important. But, although the language of bureaucratic decisionmaking can be dehumanizing, it is also a prerequisite for the kind of compassion that is needed in contemporary society. Elaine Scarry has developed a comparison between individual compassion and statistical compassion.' Individual compassion is familiar—when we see a person suffering, or hear the story of some terrible tragedy, we are moved to take action. Statistical compassion seems foreign—we hear only a string of numbers but must comprehend "the concrete realities embedded there."' Individual compassion derives from our social nature, and may be hardwired directly into the human brain.' Statistical compassion calls on us to use our higher reasoning power to extend our natural compassion to the task of solving more abstract—but no less real—problems. Because compassion is not just about making us feel better—which we could do as easily by forgetting about a problem as by addressing it—we have a responsibility to make the best decisions that we can. This book argues that cost-benefit analysis, properly conducted, can improve environmental and public health policy. Cost-benefit analysis—the translation of human lives and acres of forest into the language of dollars and cents—can seem harsh and impersonal. But such an approach is also necessary to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make. Saving the most lives, and best protecting the quality of our environment and our health—in short, exercising our compassion most effectively—requires us to step back and use our best analytic tools. Sometimes, in order to save a life, we need to treat a person like a number. This is the challenge of statistical compassion. This book is about making good decisions. It focuses on the area of environmental, health and safety regulation. These regulations have been the source of numerous and hard-fought controversies over the past several decades, particularly at the federal level. Reaching the right decisions in the areas of environmental protection, increasing safety, and improving public health is clearly of high importance. Although it is admirable (and fashionable) for people to buy green or avoid products made in sweatshops, efforts taken at the individual level are not enough to address the pressing problems we face—there is a vital role for government in tackling these issues, and sound collective decisions concerning regulation are needed. There is a temptation to rely on gut-level decisionmaking in order to avoid economic analysis, which, to many, is a foreign language on top of seeming cold and unsympathetic. For government to make good decisions, however, it cannot abandon reasoned analysis. Because of the complex nature of governmental decisions, we have no choice but to deploy complex analytic tools in order to make the best choices possible. Failing to use these tools, which amounts to abandoning our duties to one another, is not a legitimate response. Rather, we must exercise statistical compassion by recognizing what numbers of lives saved represent: living and breathing human beings, unique, with rich inner lives and an interlocking web of emotional relationships. The acres of a forest can be tallied up in a chart, but that should not blind us to the beauty of a single stand of trees. We need to use complex tools to make good decisions while simultaneously remembering that we are not engaging in abstract exercises, but that we are having real effects on people and the environment. In our personal lives, it would be unwise not to shop around for the best price when making a major purchase, or to fail to think through our options when making a major life decision. It is equally foolish for government to fail to fully examine alternative policies when making regulatory decisions with life-or-death consequences. This reality has been recognized by four successive presidential administrations. Since 1981, the cost-benefit analysis of major regulations has been required by presidential order. Over the past twenty-five years, however, environmental and other progressive groups have declined to participate in the key governmental proceedings concerning the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations, instead preferring to criticize the technique from the outside. The resulting asymmetry in political participation has had profound negative consequences, both for the state of federal regulation and for the technique of cost-benefit analysis itself. Ironically, this state of affairs has left progressives open to the charge of rejecting reason, when in fact strong environmental and public health pro-grams are often justified by cost-benefit analysis. It is time for progressive groups, as well as ordinary citizens, to retake the high ground by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis. The difference between being unthinking—failing to use the best tools to analyze policy—and unfeeling—making decisions without compassion—is unimportant: Both lead to bad policy. Calamities can result from the failure to use either emotion or reason. Our emotions provide us with the grounding for our principles, our innate interconnectedness, and our sense of obligation to others. We use our powers of reason to build on that emotional foundation, and act effectively to bring about a better world.

#### This moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize

Jeffrey Issac (professor of political science at Indiana University) 2002 Dissent, Spring, ebsco

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### In a nuclear world we have to weigh consequences.

Sissela Bok (Professor of Philosophy) 1998 Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. David Rosenthal and Fudlou Shehadi

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

#### The means/ends distinction is inevitable and a moral cop out. There are no absolutes. You have to weigh comparative risks.

Saul Alinsky (Professor and Social Organizer with International Fame, Founder of the Industrial Areas Foundation) 1971 Rules for Radicals, p. 24-27

We cannot think first and act afterwards. From the moment of birth we are immersed in action and can only fitfully guide it by taking thought. Alfred North Whitehead That perennial question, “Does the end justify the means?” is meaningless as it stands; the real and only question regarding the ethics of means and ends is, and always has been, “Does this particular end justify this particular means?” Life and how you live it is the story of means and ends. The end is what you want, and the means is how you get it. Whenever we think about social change, the question of means and ends arises. The man of action views the issue of means and ends arises. The man of action views the issue of means and ends in pragmatic and strategic terms. He has no other problem; he thinks only of his actual resources and the possibilities of various choices of action. He asks of ends only whether they are achievable and worth the cost; of means, only whether they will work. To say that corrupt means corrupt the ends is to believe in the immaculate conception of ends and principles. The real arena is corrupt and bloody. Life is a corrupting process from the time a child learns to play his mother off against his father in the politics of when to go to bed; he who fears corruption fears life. The practical revolutionary will understand Geothe’s “conscience is the virtue of observers and not of agents of action”; in action, one does not always enjoy the luxury of a decision that is consistent both with one’s individual conscience and the good of [hu]mankind. The choice must always be for the latter. Action is for mass salvation and not for the individual’s personal salvation. He who sacrifices the mass good for his personal conscience has peculiar conception of “personal salvation”; he doesn’t care enough for people to be “corrupted” for them. The men [people] who pile up the heaps of discussion and literature on the ethics of means and ends—which with rare exception is conspicuous for its sterility—rarely write about their won experiences in the perpetual struggle of life and change. They are strangers, moreover, to the burdens and problems of operational responsibility and the unceasing pressure for immediate decisions. They are passionately committed to a mystical objectivity where passions are suspect. They assume a nonexistent situation where man suspect. They assume a nonexistent situation where men dispassionately and with reason draw and devise means and ends as if studying a navigational chart on land. They can be recognized by one of two verbal brands; “We agree with the ends but not the means,” or “This is not the time.” The means-and-end moralists or non-doers always wind up on their ends without any means. The means-and-ends moralists, constantly obsessed with the ethics of the means used by the Have-Nots against the Haves, should search themselves as to their real political position. In fact, they are passive—but real—allies of the Haves. They are the ones Jacques Maritain referred to in his statement, “The fear of soiling ourselves by entering the context of history is not virtue, but a way of escaping virtue.” These non-doers were the ones who chose not to fight the Nazis in the only way they could have been fought; they were the ones who drew their window blinds to shut out the shameful spectacle of Jews and political prisoners being dragged through the streets; they were the ones who privately deplored the horror of it all—and did nothing. This is the nadir of immorality. The most unethical of all means is the nonuse of any means. It is this species of man how so vehemently and militantly participated in that classically idealistic debate at the old League of Nations on the ethical differences between defensive and offensive weapons. Their fears of action drive them to refuge in an ethics so divorced from the politics of life that it can apply only to angels, not to men. The standards of judgment must be rooted in the whys and wherefores of life as it is lived, the world as it is, not our wished-for fantasy of the world as it should be. I present here a series of rules pertaining to the ethics of means and ends: first, that one’s concern with the ethics of means and ends varies inversely with one’s personal interest in the issue. When we are not directly concerned our morality overflows; as La Rochefoucauld put it, “We all have strength enough to endure the misfortunes of others.” Accompanying this rule is the parallel one that one’s concern with the ethics of means and ends varies inversely with one’s distance from the scene of conflict. The second rule of the ethics of means and ends is that the judgment of the ethics of means is dependent upon the political position of those sitting in judgment. If you actively opposed the Nazi occupation and joined the underground Resistance, then you adopted the means of assassination, terror, properly destruction, the bombing of tunnels and trains, kidnapping, and the willingness to sacrifice innocent hostages to the end of defeating the Nazis. Those who opposed the Nazi conquerors regarded the Resistance as a secret army of selfless, patriotic idealists, courageous beyond expectation and willing to sacrifice their lives to their moral convictions.

#### Utilitarianism doesn’t justify evil—their examples are oversimplified exaggerations that mischaracterize utility—things like slavery don’t maximize the public good

Richard Palmer (professor at SUNY Fredonia) 1992 Teaching Philosophy, March

It seems that such oversimplifications are often couched in hypothetical contexts that pretend to show that they are the only alternative possibilities. Hypothetical contexts or “examples” purporting to show that utilitarianism would endorse slavery, torture, etc., are often modeled along the following lines: Suppose that the only possibilities open to us were society exactly as it is but with the institution of slavery, and society exactly as it is but without the institution of slavery, and further suppose keeping society exactly as it is but instituting slavery were the action which would produce more good or less harm than any other alternative open to use, then slavery would be right. But slavery is not (would not be) right, so utilitarianism is wrong! But where would the claim “slavery would not be right” come from? Surely from our recognition that society (as it is) with slavery would be more morally objectionable than society (as it is) without slavery. So the supposition that society would be better, or produce more good, or less harm, is patently contrary to fact, contrary to intuition, and contrary to moral (including utilitarian) training. It seems to us that such contrary to fact subjunctives generate only contrary to fact conclusions: If slavery would improve society, (which it would not), then slavery would be right, (which it is not). If society would be improved by slavery (which it would not), then utilitarianism would endorse slavery (which it does not). Since utilitarianism would endorse slavery (which we know would not make society better) then utilitarianism must be false. Such is often the form of the critics’ suggestion. But in society as we know it utilitarianism would not endorse slavery, because slavery would not improve society, and so utilitarianism is not mistaken. The critics’ suppositions, that in society as it currently exists torture or slavery are the actions which of all the alternatives open to us, would produce more good or less harm for all people affected than any other actions, are so far-fetched that one does not (perhaps cannot) have any concept of the differencs in societal circumstances which would have to prevail in order to make these actions preferable to any others.

#### Not the root cause of conflict – other factors overwhelm

Volf 2002 Miroslav Volf (Henry B. Wright Professor of Theology at Yale Divinity School since 1998) Journal of Ecumenical Studies 1-1-02

Though “otherness”–cultural, ethnic, religious, racial difference–is an important factor in our relations with others, we should not overestimate it as a cause of conflict. During the war in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990′s, I was often asked, “What is this war about? Is it about religious and cultural differences? Is it about economic advantage? Is it about political power? Is it about land?” The correct response was, of course, that the war was about all of these things. Monocausal explanations of major eruptions of violence are rarely right. Moreover, various causes are intimately intertwined, and each contributes to others. That holds true also for otherness, which I am highlighting here. However, neither should we underestimate otherness as a factor. The contest for political power, for economic advantage, and for a share of the land took place between people who belonged to discrete cultural and ethnic groups. Part of the goal of the war in the former Yugoslavia was the creation of ethnically clean territories with economic and political autonomy. The importance of “otherness” is only slightly diminished if we grant that the sense of ethnic and religious belonging was manipulated by unscrupulous, corrupt, and greedy politicians for their own political and economic gain. The fact that conjured fears for one’s identity could serve to legitimize a war whose major driving force lay elsewhere is itself a testimony to how much “otherness” matters.

#### Democratic checks prevent their impact from escalating

O’Kane 1997 (“Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics”, Economy and Society, February, ebsco)

Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition (Nazis in power) in the explanation of the Holocaust. Modern bureaucracy is not ‘intrinsically capable of genocidal action’ (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ‘ordinary and common’ attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.

#### We control uniqueness – wars are declining now – your theoretical impacts don’t match reality

Marshall and Cole 2009 Monty G. Marshall (Research Professor in the George Mason University School of Public Policy and Director of Research at the Center for Global Policy) and Benjamin R Cole (Hood House Lecturer in International Affairs at the University of New Hampshire, He holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in Political Science from the University of New Hampshire and is completing his doctoral studies in the School of Public Policy at George Mason University) 2009 “Global Report 2009 Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility” pg 7-8, http://www.systemicpeace.org/Global%20Report%202009.pdf

The most encompassing observation that can be made regarding global system performance in regard to the conflict dimension concerns the status of major episodes of political violence (armed conflict). These include societal (civil, ethnic, and communal) and interstate (including independence) warfare.3 The global trend in major armed conflict has continued its dramatic decline during the globalization era both in numbers of states affected by major armed conflicts and in total magnitude (figure 3). According to our calculations, the global magnitude of warfare has decreased by over sixty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by the end of 2009 to its lowest level since 1960. Societal warfare has been the predominant mode of warfare since the mid-1950s; increasing steeply and steadily through the Cold War period. This steep, linear increase in societal warfare is largely explained by a general tendency toward longer, more protracted, wars during that period; internal wars often receiving crucial military and/or material support from foreign states, in many cases linked to the competing superpowers. In contrast, the rate of onset of new societal wars has remained constant since 1946 to the present with an average of about four new societal wars per year. In contrast, the global trend in interstate warfare has remained at a relatively low level since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations Organization (UN). The UN was specially designed to “maintain international peace and security” without “interven[ing] in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” Although there was a moderate increase in interstate wars during the latter years of the Cold War, from 1977 to 1987, like civil warfare, interstate warfare has also declined substantially since the end of the Cold War. Of the interstate wars that took place during the Cold War period, many of the most serious were wars of independence fought during the decolonization phase that occurred during the first half of the Cold War period. Of the conventional interstate wars, onsets occurred at the rate of about one event per year, although onsets occurred at about double that rate during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Of sixty seven such wars, three-quarters remained at fairly low levels of violence.

#### No mindless intervention

Mandelbaum 2011 (Michael Mandelbaum, A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; and Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “CFR 90th Anniversary Series on Renewing America: American Power and Profligacy,” Jan 2011)

I think it is, Richard. And I think that this period really goes back two decades. I think the wars or the interventions in Somalia, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Haiti belong with the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, although they were undertaken by different administrations for different reasons, and had different costs. But all of them ended up in the protracted, unexpected, unwanted and expensive task of nation building. Nation building has never been popular. The country has never liked it. It likes it even less now. And I think we're not going to do it again. We're not going to do it because there won't be enough money. We're not going to do it because there will be other demands on the public purse. We won't do it because we'll be busy enough doing the things that I think ought to be done in foreign policy. And we won't do it because it will be clear to politicians that the range of legitimate choices that they have in foreign policy will have narrowed and will exclude interventions of that kind. So I believe and I say in the book that the last -- the first two post-Cold War decades can be seen as a single unit. And that unit has come to an end.

#### “Structural violence” is reductive and inevitable

Boulding 1977 (Kenneth E. Boulding, economist, educator, peace activist, poet, religious mystic, devoted Quaker, systems scientist, and interdisciplinary philosopher, “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1, JSTOR)

Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of 'structural violence' 'and 'positive peace'. They are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and meta- phors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condi- tion in which more than half the human race lives, is 'like' a thug beating up the victim and 'taking his money away from him in the street, or it is 'like' a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the modern world at least there is not very much. Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else in 'the world, everything is somewhat related to every- thing else.¶ There is a very real problem of the struc- tures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galitung's metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted atten- tion from this problem. Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a 'threshold' phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some 'threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. Thresh- old phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent 'breaks' in the system rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the 'strain' on a system is too great for its 'strength'. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficult to separate them.¶ The diminution of violence involves two¶ possible strategies, or a mixture of the two;¶ one is the increase in the strength of the sys-¶ tem, 'the other is the diminution of the strain.¶ The strength of systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these 'things which enable a system to stand increasing¶ strain without breaking down into violence. The strains on the system 'are largely dy- namic in character, such as arms races, mu- tually stimulated hostility, changes in rela- tive economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflicts of interest 'are only part 'of the strain on a sys-¶ tem, and not always the most important part. It is very hard for people ito know their interests, and misperceptions of 'interest take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people's behavior, not the 'real' interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between perception and reality can be very large and re- sistant to change.¶ However, what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined 'byone un- kind commenltatoras anything that Galitung doesn't like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, on that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by some- body else. The concept has been expanded to include all 'theproblems of poverty, desti- tution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormouslyreal and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to 'the structures whi'ch produce violence. This is not rto say that the cultures of vio- lence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though not all poverty cultures are cultures of violence, and cer- tainly not all cultures of violence are pover- ty cultures. But the dynamicslof poverty and the success or failure to rise out of it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural violence performed a service in calling attention to a problem, it may have done a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.

#### Human life is inherently valuable

Penner 2005 Melinda Penner (Director of Operations – STR, Stand To Reason) 2005 “End of Life Ethics: A Primer”, Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5223

Intrinsic value is very different. Things with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake. They don’t have to achieve any other goal to be valuable. They are goods in themselves. Beauty, pleasure, and virtue are likely examples. Family and friendship are examples. Something that’s intrinsically valuable might also be instrumentally valuable, but even if it loses its instrumental value, its intrinsic value remains. Intrinsic value is what people mean when they use the phrase "the sanctity of life." Now when someone argues that someone doesn’t have "quality of life" they are arguing that life is only valuable as long as it obtains something else with quality, and when it can’t accomplish this, it’s not worth anything anymore. It's only instrumentally valuable. The problem with this view is that it is entirely subjective and changeable with regards to what might give value to life. Value becomes a completely personal matter, and, as we all know, our personal interests change over time. There is no grounding for objective human value and human rights if it’s not intrinsic value. Our legal system is built on the notion that humans have intrinsic value. The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that each person is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights...." If human beings only have instrumental value, then slavery can be justified because there is nothing objectively valuable that requires our respect. There is nothing other than intrinsic value that can ground the unalienable equal rights we recognize because there is nothing about all human beings that is universal and equal. Intrinsic human value is what binds our social contract of rights. So if human life is intrinsically valuable, then it remains valuable even when our capacities are limited. Human life is valuable even with tremendous limitations. Human life remains valuable because its value is not derived from being able to talk, or walk, or feed yourself, or even reason at a certain level. Human beings don’t have value only in virtue of states of being (e.g., happiness) they can experience. The "quality of life" view is a poison pill because once we swallow it, we’re led down a logical slippery slope. The exact same principle can be used to take the life of human beings in all kinds of limited conditions because I wouldn't want to live that way. Would you want to live the life of a baby with Down’s Syndrome? No? Then kill her. Would you want to live the life of an infant with cerebral palsy? No? Then kill him. Would you want to live the life of a baby born with a cleft lip? No? Then kill her. (In fact, they did.) Once we accept this principle, it justifies killing every infant born with a condition that we deem a life we don’t want to live. There’s no reason not to kill every handicapped person who can’t speak for himself — because I wouldn’t want to live that way. This, in fact, is what has happened in Holland with the Groningen Protocol. Dutch doctors euthanize severely ill newborns and their society has accepted it.

# 2NC

### Turns the Case

#### Drones destroy the ethics of battle- the lack of reciprocal risk destroys ethics

Paul Kahn 02 "The Paradox of Riskless Warfare"<http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1325&context=fss_papers> Paul W. Kahn is the Robert W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities at Yale Law School and the Director of the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights.

The requirement of reciprocity. The right of combatants to injure and kill each other is founded neither on judgments of their own moral guilt nor on judgments of the moral evil of the end for the sake of which their force is deployed. Rather, combatants are allowed to injure each other just as long as they stand in a relationship of mutual risk. The soldier who takes himself out of combat is no longer a legitimate target. The morality of the battlefield, accordingly, is a variation on the morality of individual self-defense. Injury beyond the point required for self-defense is disproportionate and, therefore, prohibited. Defending himself, the combatant advances the political objective for which force is deployed. The soldier’s privilege of self-defense is subject to a condition of reciprocity. Soldiers cannot defend themselves by threatening to injure noncombatants; they are not permitted civilian reprisals. Combatants cannot threaten the family of an enemy soldier, even if the threat would effectively induce surrender, and thus reduce the overall injuries caused by combat. These limits do not distinguish the morally guilty from the morally innocent. All may be morally innocent; all are in a tragic and dangerous situation. Nor do such limits necessarily minimize the overall suffering in a war. On efficiency grounds alone, we can never dispose of the claim that ruthlessness in the pursuit of war is the most humane method of fighting, for it brings combat to a swift end. Surely we cannot look at the battlefields of the twentieth century and conclude that the morality of jus in bello—just conduct in war—has made wars less costly or more humane. The rule of reciprocal selfdefense cannot be justified by appeal to any of our ordinary moral intuitions: it fails the test of utility, and it also fails the test of deontological rules, since it does not support the moral autonomy and dignity of the individual. Rather, the rule of reciprocal self-defense stands as its own first principle within a circumscribed context in which individuals act in politically compelled roles. If the fundamental principle of the morality of warfare is a right to exercise self-defense within the conditions of mutual imposition of risk, then the emergence of asymmetrical warfare represents a deep challenge. A regime capable of targeting and destroying others with the push of a button, with no human intervention but only the operation of the ultimate high tech weapon, propels us well beyond the ethics of warfare. Such a deployment of force might be morally justified—it might be used to promote morally appropriate ends—but we cannot appeal to the morality of warfare to justify this mode of combat. It would be a mistake to believe that we remain sufficiently far from this high-tech image that the problem does not press upon us practically. Riskless warfare can be a product of technological innovation, but it is also a function of political decisions. In Kosovo, Western forces were reported to be operating under a policy that missions were not to be undertaken if there was a serious risk of casualties. The situation in Afghanistan is less clear. While the losses are few, an outsider at least has the impression of reciprocal risk. The political leadership took a different position from that in Kosovo, warning the public that in this case there would be casualties, that sacrifice would be required. There are, however, likely to be more, not fewer, Kosovos in our future.

### A2: Aff Solves

#### Aff fails cant overcome striving for security

Liotta 2005 (P. H. Liotta, Professor of Humanities at Salve Regina University, Newport, RI, and Executive Director of the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy, 2005 “Through the Looking Glass” Sage Publications)

Although it seems attractive to focus on exclusionary concepts that insist on desecuritization, privileged referent objects, and the ‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are little more than social constructions (Grayson, 2003), all these concepts work in theory but fail in practice. While it may be true that national security paradigms can, and likely will, continue to dominate issues that involve human security vulnerabilities – and even in some instances mistakenly confuse ‘vulnerabilities’ as ‘threats’ – there are distinct linkages between these security concepts and applications. With regard to environmental security, for example, Myers (1986: 251) recognized these linkages nearly two decades ago: National security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to watersheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security. Ultimately, we are far from what O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) term a global intervention capability on behalf of ‘humanitarian transformation’. Granted, we now have the threat of mass casualty terrorism anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet, the global community today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises. We are nowhere closer to addressing how best to solve these challenges, even as they affect issues of environmental, human, national (and even ‘embedded’) security. Recently, there have been a number of voices that have spoken out on what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the ‘responsibility to protect’:10 the responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. Yet, the creation of a sense of urgency to act – even on some issues that may not have some impact for years or even decades to come – is perhaps the only appropriate first response. The real cost of not investing in the right way and early enough in the places where trends and effects are accelerating in the wrong direction is likely to be decades and decades of economic and political frustration – and, potentially, military engagement. Rather than justifying intervention (especially military), we ought to be justifying investment. Simply addressing the immensities of these challenges is not enough. Radical improvements in public infrastructure and support for better governance, particularly in states and municipalities (especially along the Lagos–Cairo–Karachi–Jakarta arc), will both improve security and create the conditions for shrinking the gap between expectations and opportunity. A real debate ought to be taking place today. Rather than dismissing ‘alternative’ security foci outright, a larger examination of what forms of security are relevant and right among communities, states, and regions, and which even might apply to a global rule-set – as well as what types of security are not relevant – seems appropriate and necessary. If this occurs, a truly remarkable tectonic shift might take place in the conduct of international relations and human affairs. Perhaps, in the failure of states and the international community to respond to such approaches, what is needed is the equivalent of the 1972 Stockholm conference that launched the global environmental movement and established the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), designed to be the environmental conscience of the United Nations. Similarly, the UN Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in 1996 focused on the themes of finding adequate shelter for all and sustaining human development in an increasingly urbanized world. Whether or not these programs have the ability to influence the future’s direction (or receive wide international support) is a matter of some debate. Yet, given that the most powerful states in the world are not currently focusing on these issues to a degree sufficient to produce viable implementation plans or development strategies, there may well need to be a ‘groundswell’ of bottom-up pressure, perhaps in the form of a global citizenry petition to push the elusive world community toward collective action.Recent history suggests that military intervention as the first line of response to human security conditions underscores a seriously flawed approach. Moreover, those who advocate that a state’s disconnectedness from globalization is inversely proportional to the likelihood of military (read: US) intervention fail to recognize unfolding realities (Barnett, 2003, 2004). Both middle-power and major-power states, as well as the international community, must increasingly focus on long-term creeping vulnerabilities in order to avoid crisis responses to conditions of extreme vulnerability. Admittedly, some human security proponents have recently soured on the viability of the concept in the face of recent ‘either with us or against us’ power politics (Suhrke, 2004). At the same time, and in a bit more positive light, some have clearly recognized the sheer impossibility of international power politics continuing to feign indifference in the face of moral categories. As Burgess (2004: 278) notes, ‘for all its evils, one of the promises of globalization is the unmasking of the intertwined nature of ethics and politics in the complex landscape of social, economic, political and environmental security’**.** While it is still not feasible to establish a threshold definition for human security that neatly fits all concerns and arguments (as suggested by Owen, 2004: 383), it would be a tragic mistake to assume that national, human, and environmental security are mutually harmonious constructs rather than more often locked in conflictual and contested opposition with each other. Moreover, aspects of security resident in each concept are indeed themselves embedded with extraordinary contradictions. Human security, in particular, is not now, nor should likely ever be, the mirror image of national security. Yet, these contradictions are not the crucial recognition here. On the contrary, rather than focusing on the security issues themselves, we should be focusing on the best multi-dimensional approaches to confronting and solving them. One approach, which might avoid the massive tidal impact of creeping vulnerabilities, is to sharply make a rudder shift from constant crisis intervention toward strategic planning, strategic investment, and strategic attention. Clearly, the time is now to reorder our entire approach to how we address – or fail to address – security.

### Link

#### The detention-drones tradeoff is empirically true

Goldsmith 12 – Professor of Law @ Harvard

(Jack, “Proxy Detention in Somalia, and the Detention-Drone Tradeoff,” June, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/06/proxy-detention-in-somalia-and-the-detention-drone-tradeoff/)

There has been speculation about the effect of the Obama administration’s pinched detention policy – i.e. no new detainees brought to GTMO, and no new detainees to Parwan (Afghanistan) from outside Afghanistan – on its other counterterrorism policies. I have long believed there must be some tradeoff between narrowing U.S. detention capabilities and other counterterrorism options, at least implicitly, and not necessarily for the better. As I wrote three years ago, in response to news reports that the Obama administration’s cutback on USG detentions resulted in more USG drone strikes and more outsourcing of rendition, detention, and interrogation:¶ There are at least two problems with this general approach to incapacitating terrorists. First, it is not ideal for security. Sometimes it would be more useful for the United States to capture and interrogate a terrorist (if possible) than to kill him with a Predator drone. Often the United States could get better information if it, rather than another country, detained and interrogated a terrorist suspect. Detentions at Guantanamo are more secure than detentions in Bagram or in third countries.¶ The second problem is that terrorist suspects often end up in less favorable places. Detainees in Bagram have fewer rights than prisoners at Guantanamo, and many in Middle East and South Asian prisons have fewer yet. Likewise, most detainees would rather be in one of these detention facilities than be killed by a Predator drone. We congratulate ourselves when we raise legal standards for detainees, but in many respects all we are really doing is driving the terrorist incapacitation problem out of sight, to a place where terrorist suspects are treated worse.¶ The main response to this argument – especially as it applies to the detention-drone tradeoff – has been to deny any such tradeoff on the ground that there are no terrorists outside of Afghanistan (a) whom the United States is in a position to capture on the ground (as opposed to kill from the sky), and (b) whom the USG would like to detain and interrogate. Dan Klaidman’s book provides some counter-evidence, but I will save my analysis of that for a review I am writing. Here I would like to point to an important story by Eli Lake that reveals that the “United States soldiers have been hunting down al Qaeda affiliates in Somalia”; that U.S. military and CIA advisers work closely with the Puntland Security Force in Somalia, in part to redress piracy threats but mainly to redress threats from al-Shabab; that the Americans have since 2009 captured and brought to the Bosaso Central Prison sixteen people (unclear how many are pirates and how many are al-Shabab); and that American interrogators are involved in questioning al-Shabab suspects. The thrust of Lake’s story is that the conditions of detention at the Bosaso Central Prison are atrocious. But the story is also important for showing that that the United States is involved outside of Afghanistan in capturing members of terrorists organizations that threaten the United States, and does have a national security need to incapacitate and interrogate them. It does not follow, of course, that the USG can or should be in the business of detaining every al-Shabab suspect currently detained in the Bosaso Central Prison. But the Lake story does show that the alternatives to U.S. detention are invariably worse from a human rights perspective. It portends (along with last month’s WPR Report and related DOD press release) that our creeping involvement on the ground in places like Somalia and Yemen mean that the USG will in fact be in a position to capture higher-level terrorists in al Qaeda affiliates. And that in turn suggests that the factual premise underlying the denial of a detention-drone tradeoff will become harder and harder to defend.

## Case

**Threats real and not constructed—rational risk assessment goes aff**

Knudsen 2001 (Olav Knudsen, Political Science Professor at Sodertorn, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies, Security Dialogue)

Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states 'really' face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors' own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a **misleading conception of threat**, in that it discounts an independent existence for what- ever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena **do not occur simultaneously** to large numbers of politicians, and **hardly most of the time**. During the Cold War, threats - in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger - referred to 'real' phenomena, and they **refer to 'real' phenomena** now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both ín terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ’One can View “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real - it is the utterance itself that is the act.’24 The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & WaeVer’s joint article of the same year.” As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics.” It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article." This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made 'threats' and ’threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that **urgent action may be required**. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of 'security' and the consequent ’politics of panic', as Waever aptly calls it.” Now, here - in the case of urgency - another baby is thrown out with the Waeverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of 'abolishing' threatening phenomena ’out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Waever does, we should continue paying attention to them, because **situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back** and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.

#### No spiral of security – states underestimate threats

Schweller 2004 (Randall L. Schweller, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, 2004 “Unanswered Threats A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” International Security 29.2 (2004) 159-201, Muse)

Despite the historical frequency of underbalancing, little has been written on the subject. Indeed, Geoffrey Blainey's memorable observation that for "every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace" could have been made with equal veracity about overreactions to threats as opposed to underreactions to them.92 Library shelves are filled with books on the causes and dangers of exaggerating threats, ranging from studies of domestic politics to bureaucratic politics, to political psychology, to organization theory. By comparison, there have been few studies at any level of analysis or from any theoretical perspective that directly explain why states have with some, if not equal, regularity underestimated dangers to their survival. There may be some cognitive or normative bias at work here. Consider, for instance, that there is a commonly used word, paranoia, for the unwarranted fear that people are, in some way, "out to get you" or are planning to do one harm. I suspect that just as many people are afflicted with the opposite psychosis: the delusion that everyone loves you when, in fact, they do not even like you. Yet, we do not have a familiar word for this phenomenon. Indeed, I am unaware of any word that describes this pathology (hubris and overconfidence come close, but they plainly define something other than what I have described). That noted, international relations theory does have a frequently used phrase for the pathology of states' underestimation of threats to their survival, the so-called Munich analogy. The term is used, however, in a disparaging way by theorists to ridicule those who employ it. The central claim is that the naïveté associated with Munich and the outbreak of World War II has become an overused and inappropriate analogy because few leaders are as evil and unappeasable as Adolf Hitler. Thus, the analogy either mistakenly causes leaders [End Page 198] to adopt hawkish and overly competitive policies or is deliberately used by leaders to justify such policies and mislead the public. A more compelling explanation for the paucity of studies on underreactions to threats, however, is the tendency of theories to reflect contemporary issues as well as the desire of theorists and journals to provide society with policy- relevant theories that may help resolve or manage urgent security problems. Thus, born in the atomic age with its new balance of terror and an ongoing Cold War, the field of security studies has naturally produced theories of and prescriptions for national security that have had little to say about—and are, in fact, heavily biased against warnings of—the dangers of underreacting to or underestimating threats. After all, the nuclear revolution was not about overkill but, as Thomas Schelling pointed out, speed of kill and mutual kill.93 Given the apocalyptic consequences of miscalculation, accidents, or inadvertent nuclear war, small wonder that theorists were more concerned about overreacting to threats than underresponding to them. At a time when all of humankind could be wiped out in less than twenty-five minutes, theorists may be excused for stressing the benefits of caution under conditions of uncertainty and erring on the side of inferring from ambiguous actions overly benign assessments of the opponent's intentions. The overwhelming fear was that a crisis "might unleash forces of an essentially military nature that overwhelm the political process and bring on a war thatnobody wants. Many important conclusions about the risk of nuclear war, and thus about the political meaning of nuclear forces, rest on this fundamental idea."94 Now that the Cold War is over, we can begin to redress these biases in the literature. In that spirit, I have offered a domestic politics model to explain why threatened states often fail to adjust in a prudent and coherent way to dangerous changes in their strategic environment. The model fits nicely with recent realist studies on imperial under- and overstretch. Specifically, it is consistent with Fareed Zakaria's analysis of U.S. foreign policy from 1865 to 1889, when, he claims, the United States had the national power and opportunity to expand but failed to do so because it lacked sufficient state power (i.e., the state was weak relative to society).95 Zakaria claims that the United States did [End Page 199] not take advantage of opportunities in its environment to expand because it lacked the institutional state strength to harness resources from society that were needed to do so. I am making a similar argument with respect to balancing rather than expansion: incoherent, fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats because elites view the domestic risks as too high, and they are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society. The arguments presented here also suggest that elite fragmentation and disagreement within a competitive political process, which Jack Snyder cites as an explanation for overexpansionist policies, are more likely to produce underbalancing than overbalancing behavior among threatened incoherent states.96 This is because a balancing strategy carries certain political costs and risks with few, if any, compensating short-term political gains, and because the strategic environment is always somewhat uncertain. Consequently, logrolling among fragmented elites within threatened states is more likely to generate overly cautious responses to threats than overreactions to them. This dynamic captures the underreaction of democratic states to the rise of Nazi Germany during the interwar period.97 In addition to elite fragmentation, I have suggested some basic domestic-level variables that regularly intervene to thwart balance of power predictions.

### Terrorism Talk

#### Their argument essentializes terror scholarship – it’s not a monolithic entity – defer to specific research

Michael J. Boyle '8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

Some CTS advocates have positioned the CTS project against something usually called ‘terrorism studies’, ‘Orthodox terrorism studies’ or, alternatively, ‘terrorology’. Whatever these bodies of literature are (or at least are imagined by those who have created them as such), they are recent intellectual constructions, the product of an over-generalization that has emerged from the identification of (1) the limitations associated with terrorism research to date, coupled with (2) a less than complete understanding of the nature of research on terrorism. **A cursory review of the terrorism literature reveals that attempts to generalize about something called Orthodox Terrorism Studies are deeply problematic. Among terrorism scholars, there are wide disagreements about, among others, the definition of terrorism, the causes of terrorism, the role and value of the concept of ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism’, the role of state terror, the role that foreign policy plays in motivating or facilitating terrorism, the ethics of terrorism, and the proper way to conduct ‘counter-terrorism’**. A cursory examination of the contents of the two most well-known terrorism journals Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism quickly reveals this. **These differences, and the concomitant disagreements that result in the literature, cut across disciplines** – principally political science and psychology, but also others, such as anthropology, sociology, theology, and philosophy – **and even within disciplines wide disagreements about methods** (for example, discourse analysis, rational choice, among others) **persist. To suggest that they can be lumped together as something called ‘terrorology’ or ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ belies a narrow reading of the literature. This is, in short, a ‘straw man’ which helps position CTS in the field but is not based on a well-grounded critique of the current research on terrorism.**

#### Terrorism studies are epistemologically and methodologically valid---our authors are self-reflexive

Michael J. Boyle '8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problemsolving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be ‘a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism “knowledge”’. **An implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological** **problems**. In fact**, terrorism scholars are not only well aware of these problems, but also have provided their own** searching **critiques** of the field at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, ‘Understanding Terrorism’). **Some of those scholars most associated with the critique of empiricism** implied in ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ **have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism**. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by **Schmid and Jongman** (1988) to support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the second edition they **point out** that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the **failure to address** persistent conceptual and **data problems** has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly, **Silke’s** (2004) **volume on the state of the field of terrorism research performed a similar function**, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. **A non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.**

#### 4GW coming now

Barno 2011 [Lt. Gen. (ret.) David W. Barno is a senior adviser and senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, D.C. From 2003 to 2005, he served as overall U.S. commander in Afghanistan, leading more than 20,000 U.S. and coalition troops. A 1976 West Point graduate with an M.A. in National Security Studies from Georgetown University, Lt. Gen. Barno served for many of his early years of active duty in Army Ranger battalions, including in combat operations in the Panama and Grenada invasions. 22 Mar 2011 World Politics Review “Military Power in a Disorderly World” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8259/military-power-in-a-disorderly-world]

The opening acts of the 21st century have fundamentally challenged long-held notions of military power. The past decade has unveiled not only the disruptive power of terrorist groups with global reach, but also the ability of low-budget insurgent groups to directly confront the best military forces of the West -- with surprising success. Moreover, recent revolutionary events across the Arab world have demonstrated the limits of military power when facing mass popular uprisings. Disorder, chaos and violent extremism seem on course to replace state-on-state violence as the most common forms of conflict in the new century. Given this new security environment, the U.S. military must begin to play a larger role in conflict prevention in order to fully realize its value, commensurate with its cost, in this new disorderly world.

### Indef Causes terror

#### Civilian trials would send Al Qaeda fighters back to battle

Taylor 2009 [Stuart S. Taylor, Jr. is an author and freelance journalist focusing on legal and policy issues, National Journal contributing editor, (occasionally) Stanford Law School lecturer and practicing lawyer, and nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution January 30, 2009 National Journal “Obama's Dangerous Detainees” http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/or\_20090117\_2727.php]

Indeed, the Pentagon said on January 13 that 18 of the approximately 500 Guantanamo detainees already released have definitely returned "to the fight" against America and that another 43 are suspected of doing so. Critics gave these claims little credibility because the Pentagon refused to provide details.¶ Meanwhile, human-rights activists have been seeking to create the false impressions that not many of the Guantanamo detainees are dangerous; that those who are can be prosecuted; and that the rest can be safely released.¶ But the military has determined that only about 60 of the 250 detainees could be released relatively safely, if other countries would take them, and that only 80 of the rest (including 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed) could face trial for war crimes by Bush's special "military commissions."¶ Obama may decide that more than 60 are not dangerous. Otherwise, that leaves 110 or so detainees who are considered both too dangerous to release and not-prosecutable; at least, military commission prosecutors have found no basis for charging them or (in some cases) the charges have been dismissed.¶ The number who could be prosecuted might well be lower than 80 if Obama follows through on his declared intent to move any and all prosecutions of detainees to ordinary federal or military courts. The president-elect reportedly, and in my view rightly, plans to suspend use of the military commissions. They have been an international embarrassment, in part because their rules allow for use of some evidence obtained through coercive interrogation.¶ Some of the apparently dangerous detainees could not be convicted because there is no (or not enough) evidence that they have acted on their declared intent to kill Americans; some because the evidence against them was obtained by intelligence sources and methods too sensitive to be aired in a public trial or even shown to defendants; and some (perhaps including Qahtani) because the only strong evidence was obtained through coercive interrogation, involves hearsay, or is otherwise inadmissible.¶ The "prosecute or release" approach demanded by groups such as the ACLU and Amnesty International "fails to recognize the United States' legitimate interest in holding individuals fighting against it in armed conflict," in the words of a recent commentary by Georgetown law professor David Cole, whose view on this carries extra weight because he is a leading human-rights lawyer and Bush critic.¶ "There are .... as many as 100 detainees, who may not be prosecutable for a specific offense but who are too dangerous to release -- e.g., admitted Al Qaeda or Taliban fighters who have said that they would return to the battle in Afghanistan if released," Cole added. "These individuals can continue to be held for the duration of the ongoing armed conflict with the Taliban and Al Qaeda -- as prisoners of war, without criminal charge or criminal trial."

#### Its not a recruiting tool

Joscelyn 2010 [Thomas Joscelyn is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. DEC 27, 2010 Weekly Standard “Gitmo Is Not Al Qaeda's 'Number One Recruitment Tool'” http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/gitmo-not-al-qaedas-number-one-recruitment-tool\_524997.html?page=2]

President Obama and his surrogates have made this argument before, but they have provided no real evidence that it is true. In fact, al Qaeda’s top leaders rarely mention Guantanamo in their messages to the West, Muslims and the world at large.¶ No journalist in attendance had the opportunity to challenge President Obama’s assertion. The president should have been asked: If Guantanamo is such a valuable recruiting tool, then why do al Qaeda’s leaders rarely mention it?¶ THE WEEKLY STANDARD has reviewed translations of 34 messages and interviews delivered by top al Qaeda leaders operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan (“Al Qaeda Central”), including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, since January 2009. The translations were published online by the NEFA Foundation. Guantanamo is mentioned in only 3 of the 34 messages. The other 31 messages contain no reference to Guantanamo. And even in the three messages in which al Qaeda mentions the detention facility it is not a prominent theme.¶ Instead, al Qaeda’s leaders repeatedly focus on a narrative that has dominated their propaganda for the better part of two decades. According to bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other al Qaeda chieftains, there is a Zionist-Crusader conspiracy against Muslims. Relying on this deeply paranoid and conspiratorial worldview, al Qaeda routinely calls upon Muslims to take up arms against Jews and Christians, as well as any Muslims rulers who refuse to fight this imaginary coalition.¶ This theme forms the backbone of al Qaeda’s messaging – not Guantanamo.¶ To illustrate this point, consider the results of some basic keyword searches. Guantanamo is mentioned a mere 7 times in the 34 messages we reviewed. (Again, all 7 of those references appear in just 3 of the 34 messages.)¶ By way of comparison, all of the following keywords are mentioned far more frequently: Israel/Israeli/Israelis (98 mentions), Jew/Jews (129), Zionist(s) (94), Palestine/Palestinian (200), Gaza (131), and Crusader(s) (322). (Note: Zionist is often paired with Crusader in al Qaeda’s rhetoric.)¶ Naturally, al Qaeda’s leaders also focus on the wars in Afghanistan (333 mentions) and Iraq (157). Pakistan (331), which is home to the jihadist hydra, is featured prominently, too. Al Qaeda has designs on each of these three nations and implores willing recruits to fight America and her allies there. Keywords related to other jihadist hotspots also feature more prominently than Gitmo, including Somalia (67 mentions), Yemen (18) and Chechnya (15). ¶ Simply put, there is no evidence in the 34 messages we reviewed that al Qaeda’s leaders are using Guantanamo as a recruiting tool. Undoubtedly, “Al Qaeda Central” has released other messages during the past two years that are not included in our sample. Some of those messages may refer to Guantanamo. And some of the al Qaeda messages provided by NEFA, which does a remarkable job collecting and translating al Qaeda’s statements and interviews, may be only partial translations of longer texts.¶ However, the messages we reviewed also surely include most of what al Qaeda’s honchos have said publicly since January 2009. These messages do not support the president’s claim.

### Management DA

#### Ontology doesn’t come first or indict our scholarship

Owen 2002 (David Owen, reader of political theory at the University of Southampton, Millennium, Volume 31, Number 3, pg. 655-657)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Management solves extinction

Levy 1999 (Dr Neil Levy, fellow of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University, 1999“Discourses of the Environment” p. 215)

If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our uses of resources, we are nevertheless unable to simply leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for more, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us, for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse, or at least limit, the effects of our previous interventions. Moreover, there is another reason why our behaviour towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207). In fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is no us, but the poor of Brazil, who will bear the brunt of the misery which would result form a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternative which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formiulated by ecologists, environmentalist, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impacts which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, very much the province for Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their won conditions of life or work situate them’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the fate of our species, and of those with whone we share this planet, will be decided.

# 1NR

### A2 WE MEET

#### Detention authority is found in the AUMF and NDAA

Kelley 2012 [Michael Kelley October 24, 2012 “Why Losing Indefinite Detention Powers Would Be A Disaster For Obama” Business Insider http://www.businessinsider.com/why-losing-indefinite-detention-powers-would-be-a-disaster-for-obama-2012-10]

There's a big story by Greg Miller in the Washington Post on how the Obama administration has expanded its powers in the War on Terror.¶ Miller notes that the legal foundation for U.S. counterterrorism strategy is partially based on "the Congressional authorization to use military force" (AUMF) that was passed after 9/11.¶ Specifically it seems to be based on an interpretation of the AUMF that was "reaffirmed" by the indefinite detention clause of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). ¶ This explains why Obama is fighting so hard to keep the indefinite detention clause in effect.¶ In court the government argued that the indefinite detention clause is simply a "reaffirmation" of the Authorization Use Of Military Force (AUMF), which gives the president authority "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those ... [who] aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons." In the NDAA lawsuit, the government argued that the NDAA §1021 is simply an "affirmation" or "reaffirmation" of the AUMF.

### A2 SHUTS DOWN DEBATE

#### Turns their offense—limits are vital to creativity and innovation

David Intrator (President of The Creative Organization) October 21, 2010 “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box

One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, creativity is not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.

#### Literally doubles the educational benefit

**Arrington 2009** (Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic